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Abstract:  
In this study, we examine whether CEO gender affects the likelihood of management 
forecast issuance, forecast properties, and subsequent reactions from analysts and 
investors. We use a panel data set of CEO transitions between 2000 and 2015 to test our 
hypotheses. We find that while women CEOs are more likely to issue earnings forecasts 
after a CEO transition, the characteristics of forecasts issued by women and men CEOs do 
not differ. Furthermore, we find that CEO gender significantly affects analyst and investor 
reactions. In particular, we find that analysts and investors demonstrate a more tempered 
reaction to good news forecasts issued by women CEOs compared to men CEOs. Overall, 
our findings suggest that analysts and investors find management forecasts issued by 
women CEOs to be less credible than forecasts issued by men CEOs despite no apparent 
differences in their forecast properties. 
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1. Introduction 
More women serve as CEOs of large companies than ever before.1 In 2019, thirty-
three women are leading or have been appointed to lead firms in the Fortune 500 (Zillman 
2019).2 These appointments represent a significant increase from 2018 and signal a new 
era for women’s corporate leadership. In addition, to further bolster the presence of women 
in leadership roles, California enacted a law mandating that publicly traded companies, 
headquartered in the state, include women on their board of directors. However, despite 
these gains, research has only begun to analyze whether and how women CEOs impact 
their firms’ practices and how their decisions are evaluated by outsiders (e.g., Gupta, 
Mortal, Chakrabarty, Guo, and Turban 2019; Jeong and Harrison 2017). While some 
scholars find that women executives tend to be more conservative and risk averse (Barua, 
Davidson, Rama, and Thiruvadi 2010; Francis et al. 2015), others find minimal impacts of 
CEO gender on firm practices (Dyreng, Hanlon, and Maydew 2010; Ge, Matsumoto, and 
Zhang 2011). Overall, the existing literature has been inconclusive and Binberg (2011) 
calls for further development and examination of the effect of gender differences. In this 
study, we extend the literature by analyzing whether CEO gender impacts the properties of 
management forecasts and the response to forecasts by analysts and investors.  
We first examine whether CEO gender affects the likelihood of management 
earnings forecast issuance. Prior research argues that management forecasts are a voluntary 
disclosure that managers can use to influence their reputation (Hirst, Koonce, and 
                                            
1 Specifically, we note that the percentage of women leading Fortune 500 companies has increased from 
0.4% in 2000 to 4.8% in 2018 and peaking at 6.4% in 2017. Further, we note that the percentage of Fortune 
500 board members who are women has increased from 11.7% in 2000 to 22.2% in 2018. See Pew Research 
Center, “The Data on Women Leaders,” September 13, 2018.   
2 We also note that the number of women belonging to top executive teams has increased dramatically since 
the early 2000s (Francis, Hasan, Park, and Wu 2015).  
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Venkataraman 2008). As a result, prior studies find that managerial characteristics 
influence the likelihood of issuing a management forecast (e.g., Hribar and Yang 2016). 
According to token theory, numerical minorities, such as women in leadership roles, face 
hyper-scrutiny, performance pressures, and negative stereotypes (Eagly, Eaton, Rose, 
Riger, and McHugh 2012; Kanter 1977). To combat these pressures, women often conform 
not only to feminine role stereotypes but also to the expectations of masculine leaders (e.g., 
Bielby 2000). Further, the added scrutiny of women in leadership roles results in greater 
standards of transparency (Schubert, Brown, Gysler, and Brachinger 1999). Therefore, we 
predict that women CEOs will be more likely than men CEOs to issue an earnings forecast.  
Next, conditional on issuing an earnings forecast, we examine whether CEO gender 
is associated with different forecast properties. In addition to the bias, scrutiny, and 
performance pressures women encounter, women have been shown to be less 
overconfident and narcissistic than men (e.g., Barber and Odean 2001; Croson and Gneezy 
2009), which prior studies document influence management forecast properties (Esplin, 
Judd, and Olsen 2019; Hribar and Yang 2016). Furthermore, some studies find that women 
tend to be more risk averse than their men counterparts resulting in more conservative 
behavior (e.g., Francis et al. 2015). Therefore, we predict that women CEOs will differ 
from men CEOs in regards to the properties of their earnings forecasts. 
Finally, we examine whether analysts and investors react differently to forecasts 
issued by women CEOs compared to forecasts issued by men CEOs. Prior studies suggest 
that management forecasts influence the reactions of analysts and investors (e.g., Cotter, 
Tuna, and Wysocki 2006; Ng, Tuna, and Verdi 2013). However, the extent to which 
analysts and investors react is impacted by the perceived credibility of those management 
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forecasts (Jennings 1987). Gender research highlights that women leaders are associated 
with various negative stereotypes that will influence the perception of their overall 
credibility. For example, some of the stereotypes suggested by prior research are that 
women lack organizational fit (Heilman, Manzi, and Braun 2015), competence (Eagly and 
Carli 2007), trust (Schubert et al. 1999), and that they are risk averse (Fisk 2016). 
Therefore, we predict that the negative stereotypes of women CEOs will translate into 
greater skepticism regarding their earnings forecasts and analysts and investors will 
respond accordingly. 
We test our hypotheses by examining CEO transitions between the years 2000 and 
2015. We identify CEO transitions and gender using the Standard and Poor’s Execucomp 
database which aggregates compensation data disclosed in annual proxy statements filed 
with the SEC. We find 85 Male-to-Female CEO transitions during this time period 
compared to 2,027 Male-to-Male CEO transitions. We then require three years of data 
before and three years of data after the year of the CEO transition.3 For our empirical 
models, we require company data from other sources such as Compustat, the I/B/E/S 
Guidance and I/B/E/S Estimates files, and the Company Issued Guidance File (CIG). 
Further, we focus our main analyses on the issuance of good news forecasts. 4  The 
economic incentives of issuing a good news forecast are more compelling while bad news 
forecasts are of a different ilk.5   
Consistent with our hypothesis 1a, we document that after a CEO transition, women 
                                            
3 We note that the year of the CEO transition is removed from our analyses.   
4 However, we note that our analysis on the effect of CEO gender on the likelihood of issuing a management 
earnings forecast includes both good news and bad news forecasts.  
5 For parsimony’s sake, we include in supplemental analyses results for the bad news forecast setting, where 
the economic incentives are less clear. 
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CEOs are more likely to issue earnings forecasts than men CEOs. This finding suggests 
that women CEOs are more forthcoming and transparent in issuing management forecasts 
and supports the argument that issuing forecasts may help women CEOs combat the added 
scrutiny and pressure they face.  Despite men and women CEOs differing on the likelihood 
of issuing earnings forecasts, we do not observe any difference related to the properties of 
those forecasts (likelihood of missing, optimistic bias, and precision), inconsistent with our 
hypothesis 1b. Specifically, we find that men and women CEOs exhibit no statistical 
difference in the quality of their earnings forecasts. This suggests that women CEOs’ 
performance is equivalent to men CEOs in regards to management forecasting.   
While women CEOs issue forecasts that do not differ in forecast properties from 
men CEOs, in our next analyses we find that analysts and investors demonstrate a markedly 
tempered reaction to the forecasts if they are provided by a woman CEO, consistent with 
our hypothesis 2. This finding provides support for the argument that analysts and investors 
perceive the forecasts from women CEOs to be less credible and thus respond accordingly. 
Therefore, this finding suggests a skeptical bias toward women CEOs on the part of 
analysts and investors in as much as the forecast properties do not differ. 
In additional analyses, we first investigate whether our findings are robust to bad 
news earnings forecasts. In the bad news forecast setting, we continue to find that forecasts 
by men and women CEOs do not differ in terms of bias and precision.6 Further, we continue 
to find that analysts and investors exhibit a tempered reaction to bad news forecasts issued 
by women CEOs compared to men CEOs. Next, we adapt the model of Kothari, Shu, and 
Wysocki (2009) to examine whether CEO gender impacts bad news withholding and find 
                                            
6 In regards to the likelihood of missing their bad news forecast, we find that women CEOs are less likely to 
miss their forecast than men CEOs.   
5 
 
that women CEOs are no more or no less likely to withhold bad news relative to men CEOs 
Thus, analysts’ and investors’ muted response does not appear to be the result of bad news 
withholding. We also examine the effect of analyst experience and brokerage reputation 
(Corwin, Larocque, and Stegemoller 2017; Mikhail, Walther, and Willis 1997), and find 
that these do not explain the differential reaction by analysts to forecasts from women 
CEOs. Furthermore, we examine and find that investor disagreement, proxied by trading 
volume (Bamber, Barron, and Stobber 1997), does not explain the tempered reaction by 
investors to forecasts from women CEOs. Finally, we find that the bundling of forecasts 
with earnings announcements does not differ between men and women CEOs.  
We contribute to the literature in several ways. First, we contribute to the stream of 
literature that examines the effects of gender on corporate financial decisions (e.g., Binberg 
2011; Barua et al. 2010; Dyreng et al. 2010; Francis, Hasan, Wu, and Yan 2014; Francis et 
al. 2015; Ge et al. 2011; Gupta et al. 2019; Peni and Vahamaa 2010). Specifically, prior 
research finds that gender diversity in senior management improves the quality of reported 
earnings (Krishnan and Parsons 2008; Srinidhi, Gul and Tsui 2011), stock price 
informativeness (Gul, Srinidhi, and Ng 2011), accounting conservatism (Francis et al. 
2015; Ho, Li, Tam, and Zhang 2015), and decreases the likelihood of financial misreporting 
(Gupta et al. 2019). We add to this stream of literature by providing evidence that women 
CEOs are more likely than men CEOs to issue earnings forecasts, yet CEO gender does 
not affect the quality of those forecasts.  
Further, we contribute to the stream of literature on the leadership of women CEOs 
and the differential perception of women CEOs. Understanding how women CEOs impact 
their firms is vital for tracking the evolution of corporate leadership and the impact of 
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efforts to integrate women into leadership ranks. Understanding how women CEOs are 
perceived by outsiders is also important for understanding the constraints and opportunities 
these leaders face as newcomers to a field historically dominated by men.  Consistent with 
prior studies (Cook and Glass 2014a; Cook and Glass 2014b; Dyreng et al. 2010; Ge et al. 
2011), we find that female CEOs exhibit similar behavior to their male CEO counterparts 
in regards to management forecast characteristics. However, we find a differential 
perception of female CEOs by key market participants. Specifically, we observe stifled 
responses by analysts and investors to good news earnings forecasts from women CEOs, 
which is consistent with prior research highlighting the perceived doubts about future firm 
growth or performance from firms led by women CEOs (Adams and Ferreira 2009; Huang 
and Kisgen 2013). We thus add further evidence to the literature on how female CEOs are 
perceived by financial market participants (Carton and Rosette 2011; Cook and Glass 
2014b; Rosette, Leonardelli, and Phillips 2008). Analyzing how CEO gender impacts 
forecast characteristics and outsider reaction advances theory and research on gender, 
leadership, and firm outcomes. Token theory suggests that women leaders face hyper-
scrutiny, performance pressures, and negative stereotypes regarding their competence 
(Kanter 1977). However, research suggests that women leaders are associated with greater 
transparency and stronger governance (Glass and Cook 2018), features that could 
positively impact the assessment of their capabilities by outsiders. Therefore, the 
challenges and opportunities that women CEOs face may lead to complex or competing 
trends with regard to their impacts and evaluation as leaders. 
Next, we add to the analyst forecast literature. In a review of the analyst forecast 
literature, Bradshaw (2011) calls for additional insights into analyst forecasting behavior. 
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Prior research documents that firms walk down analyst earnings expectations (Bartov, 
Givoly, and Hayn 2002; Richardson, Teoh, and Wysocki 2004), often through the issuance 
of management earnings forecasts (Cotter et al. 2006). Furthermore, earlier studies 
document that analysts misweight earnings related information (Abarbanell and Bernand 
1992; Mendenhall 1991; Mikhail et al. 1997). We also note that prior studies find that 
analysts exhibit more bias in their forecasts when there is greater information uncertainty 
(Zhang 2006) and more earnings skewness (Gu and Wu 2003). Overall, our findings add 
to this body of research by suggesting that analysts’ revisions are not justified following 
the issuance of management earnings forecasts by women CEOs.      
Lastly, we contribute to the stream of research on the market response to 
management earnings forecasts (e.g., Hutton, Miller, and Skinner 2003; Waymire 1984; 
Williams 1996). Specifically, Baik, Farber, and Lee (2011) find that CEO ability enhances 
the credibility of management forecasts to market participants, whereas Esplin et al. (2019) 
find that investors exhibit tempered reactions to good news forecasts issued by narcissistic 
CEOs. These studies highlight the influence of CEO characteristics on market responses to 
management earnings forecasts. We add to this stream of literature by documenting that 
investors exhibit tempered reactions to good news management forecasts issued by female 
CEOs. This finding suggests that investors perceive earnings forecasts issued by women 
CEOs are less credible than forecasts issued by men CEOs even though the characteristics 
of those forecasts do not differ.         
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses prior 
literature and develops our hypotheses. Section 3 describes our research design and sample 
selection. Section 4 presents the results of our empirical analyses. Section 5 provides 
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additional analyses. Section 6 concludes.   
2. Prior Literature and Hypotheses Development 
CEO Gender & Forecast Properties 
Management earnings forecasts are a voluntary public disclosure by company 
leadership regarding the expected short-term performance of the company. The disclosure 
of management forecasts plays a key economic role in financial markets (Hilary and Hsu 
2011). Further, Hirst et al. (2008) argue that management forecasts are a critical voluntary 
disclosure mechanism that managers can utilize to influence their reputation. Prior research 
finds that managerial characteristics, such as CEO ability (Baik et al. 2011), CEO 
overconfidence (Hribar and Yang 2016), and CEO narcissism (Esplin et al. 2019) influence 
management forecast issuance. Therefore, we first explore how CEO gender might affect 
management earnings forecast issuance. 
Due to their numerical rarity, women CEOs face pressures consistent with token 
status (Kanter 1977). Token theory predicts that numerical minorities confront challenges 
including hyper-scrutiny, performance pressures and negative stereotypes (Eagly et al. 
2012; Kanter 1977). Women who serve in leadership roles traditionally associated with 
men must navigate these pressures, and their strategies often result in important gender 
differences in leadership priorities, performances and practices (Eagly and Carli 2012). The 
impacts of token status on women leaders are well documented. Due to hyper-scrutiny, 
women leaders must conform both to feminine role stereotypes and masculine leadership 
expectations (Bielby 2000; Eagly and Karau 2002; Koenig, Eagly, Mitchell, and Ristikari 
2011; Williams and Dempsey 2014). If they perform their roles in ways typically 
associated with masculinity, including self-promotion, assertiveness and dominance, they 
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face backlash and agency penalties (Eagly and Karau 2002; Rosette, Koval, Ma, and 
Livingston 2016). If, on the other hand, they conform to feminine stereotypes of warmth, 
compassion and collaboration, they are often viewed as incapable of aggressive leadership 
(Eagly and Chin 2010; Eagly and Karau 2002). This ‘double bind’ often contributes to 
negative stereotypes regarding women leaders’ competence and leadership capability (Fisk 
2016; Koenig et al. 2011; Schein 1973). Performance pressures mean that their missteps 
are often amplified, and women leaders can be blamed for negative outcomes that are 
beyond their control (Glass and Cook 2019; Meindl 1993). These challenges are 
compounded by women leaders’ relative lack of supportive professional networks, 
organizational resources and, in some instances, resistance to their authority (Burt 2000; 
Glass and Cook 2016).  
Additionally, the hyper-scrutiny of women CEOs will contribute to greater 
standards of transparency, particularly with regard to financial performance where women 
leaders’ legitimacy is most likely to be questioned (Schubert et al. 1999). In fact, women 
leaders have a stronger association with corporate social responsibility than men, including 
the areas of governance and transparency (Glass and Cook 2016; Glass, Cook and Ingersoll 
2016; Gul et al. 2011). Women leaders are also more weakly associated with corporate 
financial fraud compared to men (Capezio and Mavisakalyan 2015; Cumming, Leung, and 
Rui 2015), which is partly the result of the scrutiny they receive related to financial 
reporting. Therefore, the scrutiny and monitoring applied to women CEOs will increase 
the demand for transparent leadership. We predict that this scrutiny will lead women CEOs 
to pursue different strategies vis-à-vis earnings forecasts compared to men CEOs. In 
particular, we expect that women CEOs will be more likely than men CEOs to issue 
10 
 
earnings forecasts and state our formal hypothesis as follows: 
Hypothesis 1a: Women CEOs will be more likely than men CEOs to 
issue an earnings forecast.  
 
Conditional on issuing a management forecast, we next examine whether CEO 
gender impacts the properties of earnings forecasts. As discussed above, women face bias, 
scrutiny, and performance pressures that we expect to impact the properties of their 
earnings forecasts. In addition, prior research suggests that female executives compared to 
male executives are less overconfident (Barber and Odean 2001; Francis et al. 2014) and 
less narcissistic (Croson and Gneezy 2009; Ingersoll, Glass, Cook and Olsen 2017; Olsen 
and Cox 2001). Prior studies find that CEO overconfidence (Hribar and Yang 2016) and 
CEO narcissism (Esplin et al. 2019) are associated with various management forecast 
characteristics. 
Furthermore, prior research on gender differences suggests that female executives 
are more risk averse than their male counterparts, evidenced by the influence of gender on 
various corporate financial decisions, such as accounting conservatism, tax aggressiveness, 
disclosure transparency, reduced leverage, etc. (e.g., Francis et al. 2015; Francis et al. 2014; 
Gul et al. 2011; Huang and Kisgen 2013).7 In particular, women executives compared to 
men are more likely to champion conservative financial reporting practices (Francis et al. 
2015; Ho et al. 2015; Peni and Vahamaa 2010). Women executives are also more 
conservative when it comes to financial decisions and investments (Halko, Kaustia, and 
Alanko 2012; Jianakopolos and Bernasek 1998; Sunden and Surette 1998). Additionally, 
Huang and Kisgen (2013) find that female executives place wider bounds on earnings 
                                            
7 It is worth noting, as discussed earlier, that a female’s risk aversion does not always translate into an effect 
on corporate financial decisions. For example, Dyreng et al. (2010) and Ge et al. (2011) find no gender effect 
on tax firm avoidance and discretionary accruals.   
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estimates.8  
In sum, we expect that the bias, scrutiny, and performance pressures women CEOs 
face combined with their aversion to risk and the lower likelihood of overconfidence and 
narcissism will impact the properties of their earnings forecasts. We state our formal 
hypothesis as follows:  
Hypothesis 1b: Conditional upon issuing earnings forecasts, men 
CEOs and women CEOs will differ on the properties (i.e., likelihood 
of Missing, Optimistic Bias, and Precision) of their earnings 
forecasts. 
CEO Gender & Forecast Reactions 
We now explore how CEO gender might affect how analysts and investors react to 
management earnings forecasts. While analysts and investors are external to the firm, they 
use the information contained in management forecast disclosures to develop independent 
earnings estimates and investment decisions (Lang and Lundholm 1996; Lees 1981; Jensen 
and Meckling 1976). Thus, management forecasts proffered by the firm influence the 
reactions of analysts and investors (Baginski and Hassell 1990; Cotter et al. 2006; Hassell, 
Jennings and Lasser 1988; Jaggi 1978; Jennings 1987; Ng et al. 2013; Penman 1980; 
Waymire 1984; Waymire 1986).9 However, the extent to which outsiders, such as analysts’ 
and investors’, react to management forecasts is impacted by the perceived credibility of 
the forecasts issued (Jennings 1987). In other words, forecast reactions are interpretive and 
reflect analyst and investor assessment of the legitimacy of the firm’s forecast. 
Negative stereotypes and bias toward women leaders are well documented. 
                                            
8 While these studies highlight the potential benefits of risk aversion from CEO gender on corporate financial 
decisions, Huang and Kisgen (2013) argue that both can be detrimental to shareholders and lead to worse 
corporate financial decisions. 
9 We note that forecasts can help to align insiders’ expectations about short-term growth with investors’ 
expectations (Ajinkya and Gift 1984; Hassell and Jennings 1986), thereby reducing market uncertainty.  
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Scholars have identified a significant association between leadership and masculinity, 
contributing to the tendency to “think manager-think male” (Schein and Davidson 1993). 
While leaders are expected to be assertive, achievement oriented and decisive, women are 
assumed to be nurturing, helpful and caring (Heilman, Block and Martell 1995). Such 
gender role stereotypes lead to “lack of fit” notions that women simply lack the 
requirements necessary for successful leadership (Heilman 1983; Heilman et al. 2015). 
While such biases often limit women’s access to senior leadership roles (Johnson, Murphy, 
Zewdie, and Richard 2008), they can be heightened when women hold highly visible 
leadership positions typically associated with men. Indeed, token theory predicts that 
negative stereotypes of women leaders will be heightened in contexts where women 
represent numerical minorities (Kanter 1977).  
Research finds that women corporate leaders, including CEOs, are subject to a 
burden of doubt with regard to their competence, capability and fitness for their role (Eagly 
and Carli 2007; Puwar 2004). They are also viewed as less trustworthy and skilled, 
particularly when it comes to making financial decisions for firms (Schubert et al. 1999). 
Instead, women leaders are often assumed to be more communally oriented (Schein 2001), 
leading to a heightened commitment to long-term goals over short-term gains. Such bias 
can put women CEOs at greater risk for a range of challenges, including threats from 
activist shareholders (Gupta et al. 2019). 
Women CEOs also face stereotypes that they are less aggressive and more risk 
averse than men, leading to skepticism regarding their ability to lead effectively. While 
scholarship on risk taking suggests that women CEOs are no more risk averse than men 
CEOs (Adams and Funk 2012; Berger, Kick, and Schaeck 2014), they tend to be viewed 
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as inferior leaders incapable or unwilling to take strategic risks that could translate into 
performance gains (Fisk 2016; Gupta et al. 2019).  
Overall, the majority of research on gender stereotypes suggests that women may 
be perceived as poorly equipped for the challenges associated with leading large 
companies, and those perceptions are likely to contribute to negative expectations 
regarding their efficacy and success. Therefore, we predict that these negative stereotypes 
of women leaders will translate into greater skepticism regarding their earnings forecasts. 
To the extent that outside analysts and investors view women CEOs as ‘agentically 
deficient’ compared to men CEOs (Eagly and Karau 2002; Rosette et al. 2016), their 
forecast reactions may reflect suspicion or concern regarding women’s CEOs ability to 
achieve projected earnings. We state our second hypothesis as follows:  
Hypothesis 2: Analysts and investors will have a more tempered 
response to earnings forecasts from women CEOs than from men 
CEOs. 
 
3. Research Design 
Regression Model and Variable Definitions 
 To test hypothesis 1a, we first use the following model from Hribar and Yang 
(2016) to examine the likelihood of issuing a management forecast using annual 
management forecasts as follows:  
𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑀𝑇𝐹+ 𝛽3𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇 ∗ 𝑀𝑇𝐹 +  𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 +  𝜀          (1) 
where Issue equals one if the firm issued at least one management earnings forecast in year 
t and zero otherwise. We include Post, which is an indicator variable equal to one for the 
three years following a CEO transition. MTF is an indicator variable equal to one for male-
to-female CEO transitions. Our main variable of interest is the interaction term, Post × 
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MTF. Hypothesis 1a predicts 3 > 0, that is, that women CEOs will be more likely than 
men CEOs to issue an earnings forecast.  
We include numerous controls that prior research has shown to influence firms’ 
disclosure policies and likelihood of issuing management forecasts. LnAnalysts controls 
for the number of analysts following a firm (Feng, Li, and McVay 2009). Size is measured 
as the natural logarithm of total assets (Lang and Lundholm 1996). EarnVol controls for 
the volatility of a firm’s earnings as the standard deviation of income before extraordinary 
items scaled by average assets over the previous five years (Waymire 1985). LitRisk is the 
probability that a firm will face litigation and is measured following Rogers and Stocken 
(2005). ChgEarn is the change in year-over-year earnings scaled by year-end price. MTB 
is the ratio of a firm’s market value to book value (Bamber and Cheon 1998).  EquityIssue 
is an indicator variable equal to one if a firm issued shares in the current year and zero 
otherwise. M&A controls for a firms’ engagement in mergers and acquisitions and is 
measured as an indicator variable equal to one if the firm’s annual acquisition or merger-
related costs exceeded five percent of net income in the current year and zero otherwise. 
Weak is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm reported a material weakness during 
the sample period and zero otherwise (Feng et al. 2009). ROA controls for firm 
performance with the ratio of net income over assets (Miller 2002). Loss is an indicator 
variable equal to one if the firm reported a loss in the current year and zero otherwise. 
ShrOwn is the percentage of shares outstanding owned by the CEO in the current year. 
Vested is the CEO’s holdings of unexercised options divided by the total shares outstanding 
in the current year. Age is the CEO’s age (Brockman, Campbell, Lee, and Salas 2019). 
Dual is an indicator variable equal to one if the CEO is also the chairman of the board and 
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zero otherwise (Lee, Matsunaga, and Park 2012). Experience is the length of the 
individual’s time serving as a CEO at any company listed in Execucomp. Finally, we 
include industry and year fixed effects to account for systematic industry-wide factors, time 
trends, and transitory economy-wide factors that could affect our results.   
In order to examine our hypothesis 1b and hypothesis 2, it is important to consider 
the information content of management forecasts. Management forecasts are issued for a 
variety of reasons. Verrecchia (1983) suggests that managers release good news forecasts 
in an attempt to increase their firm’s stock price. However, the incentive for managers to 
inflate their company’s stock price through the issuance of good news forecasts induces 
skepticism about the reliability of the forecast (Hutton et al. 2003). Thus, prior research 
suggests that good news forecasts are less credible than bad news forecasts (Williams 
1996). For example, Kasznik (1999) finds that managers do not manage earnings 
downward to meet their bad news forecasts, suggesting that managers have less of an 
incentive to issue unreliable bad news forecasts. Furthermore, as noted by Hirst et al. 
(2008), the market reaction to bad news forecasts is stronger than the market reaction to 
good news forecasts, as bad news is inherently more credible than good news. We focus 
on the good news setting because the economic and image incentives are more compelling 
with good news forecasts.10  
To test Hypothesis 1b, we examine whether the properties of earnings forecasts 
issued by women CEOs differ relative to those issued by men CEOs. In order to examine 
whether CEO gender affects management earnings forecast properties, we focus our 
analysis on firms that issue management earnings forecasts. Since we can only identify the 
                                            
10 For example, Kothari et al. (2009) assert that good news forecasts are associated with managers’ continued 
employment and boost the managers’ wealth.  
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forecast properties for CEOs that have elected to issue a forecast, we control for the 
possibility of self-selection bias (Heckman 1979). We use equation (1) as the first stage in 
a two-stage Heckman procedure similar to Hribar and Yang (2016). We note that 
LnAnalysts functions as an ideal instrument in the second-stage models to control for 
endogeneity as it is a determinant of forecast issuance but not of forecast properties (e.g., 
Hribar and Yang 2016; Feng et al. 2009). To control for the self-selection bias, we include 
the inverse Mills ratio in the following model adapted from Hribar and Yang (2016):  
𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑦 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑀𝑇𝐹+ 𝛽3𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇 ∗ 𝑀𝑇𝐹 +  𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 +
𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑀𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑠 +  𝜀                       (2) 
where Forecast Property is one of three dependent variables: (1) Miss, (2) OptBias, and 
(3) Precision. Miss is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm fails to meet or exceed 
its earnings forecast and zero otherwise. OptBias is defined as the management forecast 
less realized earnings, scaled by logged assets per share. Precision is defined as negative 
one multiplied by forecast range, scaled by logged assets per share such that a larger value 
for precision represents a smaller forecast range. 
We also include several control variables, which prior research has shown 
influences the properties of management forecasts. Horizon is the natural log of the number 
of days between forecast issuance and fiscal year end. News is the management forecast 
minus the prevailing analysts’ consensus, scaled by logged assets per share. Dacc is 
discretionary accruals in year t estimated from the modified Jones model (Dechow, Sloan, 
and Sweeney 1995). Conc is the industry concentration ratio measured as the sum of 
revenue for the top five firms in the two-digit SIC code, scaled by the sum of revenue for 
all firms in the two-digit SIC code. All other variables are as previously defined and are 
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discussed in Appendix 1. For all three forecast properties regressions, we control for 
industry and year fixed effects. Hypothesis 1b predicts 3 ≠ 0, that is, that men CEOs and 
women CEOs will differ on the properties of their earnings forecasts.  
To examine hypothesis 2, we utilize the following model for analysts’ earnings 
forecast revisions and investors’ market reactions adapted from Hillary and Hsu (2011): 
𝑅𝑒𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝛥𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 + 𝛽2 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑀𝑇𝐹 + 𝛽4𝛥𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 ∗
𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽5𝛥𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 ∗ 𝑀𝑇𝐹 + 𝛽6𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 ∗ 𝑀𝑇𝐹 + 𝛽7𝛥𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 ∗
𝑀𝑇𝐹 +  𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 +  𝜀             (3) 
where Reaction is one of two dependent variables: (1) Revision and (2) CAR. Revision is 
the revised individual analyst annual earnings forecast less the prior earnings forecast 
scaled by the stock price two days prior to the forecast revision. Following Hilary and Hsu 
(2011), we include analyst forecasts in I/B/E/S that were issued up to 90 days prior to 
issuance of the management earnings forecast. We then consider an analyst forecast issued 
in the 30 days following the issuance of the management earnings forecast as a revision. 
CAR is the three-day cumulative abnormal return centered on the management earnings 
forecast date. ΔExpectations measures the change in expectations defined as the 
management forecast less the prevailing analyst consensus scaled by price two days prior 
to the management forecast announcement date. Further, we include as independent 
variables, Post and Male-to-Female, which are defined previously and discussed in 
Appendix 1. We then interact each of the three independent variables to include all two-
way interactions and the single three-way interaction term. Our main variable of interest is 
the interaction term, ∆Expectations × Post × MTF. Hypothesis 2 predicts that 7 < 0, that 
is, analysts and investors will have a more tempered response to good news earnings 
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forecasts from women CEOs than from men CEOs.  
 We also include numerous controls that prior research has shown to influence 
analysts’ and investors’ reactions to management earnings forecasts. Cover is the log of 
the number of analysts covering the firm in the ninety days preceding the management 
forecast announcement. We include controls for the difficulty of predicting earnings, 
including Loss, StdEarn, and RetVol. Loss is an indicator variable equal to one if earnings 
are negative in the year preceding the management forecast announcement date and zero 
otherwise. StdEarn is the standard deviation of quarterly return on assets over the preceding 
twelve quarters. RetVol is the standard deviation of the stock return six months before the 
management forecast date. All other variables are defined previously and are discussed in 
Appendix 1. We include industry and year fixed effects in the model for both analysts’ and 
investors’ reactions.   
Sample Selection 
For inclusion in our sample, we require that a CEO transition take place. We search 
the Execucomp database for CEO transitions between the years 2000 and 2015. We find 
85 Male-to-Female CEO transitions during this period. Appendix 2 provides a listing of all 
of these transitions. In contrast, we find there were 2,027 Male-to-Male CEO transitions in 
the same time period. We do not include CEO transitions during this time period that were 
Female-to-Male (29 instances) or Female-to-Female (1 instance) due to the limited number 
of observations. This also allows for a more distinct evaluation of the effect of CEO gender 
by comparing only the transitions that are Male-to-Female and Male-to-Male. The sample 
size and the number of CEO transitions included vary based on the empirical model used, 
and are subject to limitations of data availability for the corresponding model. We examine 
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the three years before (pre-period) and the three years after (post-period) the CEO 
transition. The year of the CEO transition is excluded from our tests. Table 1 provides 
details on the sample selection for our issuance, forecast properties, analyst revision, and 
market tests. 
-------------INSERT TABLE 1 HERE----------------- 
For our empirical models, we require company data from other sources such as 
Compustat and I/B/E/S Guidance. We obtain management forecast data from the Company 
Issued Guidance File (CIG) maintained by First Call and the I/B/E/S Estimates files. For 
our tests of forecast accuracy and forecast optimism we use the midpoint of range forecasts. 
However, to assess whether a forecast has been missed, we use the lower bound of the 
forecast range. We obtain realized earnings from the First Call and I/B/E/S Actuals Files 
to ensure consistency between management forecasts and EPS realizations.  
4. Results 
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics, correlations, and univariate comparisons for 
the variables used in our management forecast issuance sample.  Table 2 Panel A presents 
descriptive statistics for the variables used to test hypothesis 1a. We find that 43.9% of 
firm-year observations issue a management forecast. We document that the mean (median) 
total assets are $2.876 ($2.612) billion.11 Further, we find that the mean (median) ROA is 
3.2% (4.0%) and only 18.3% of firms report a loss. Taken together this suggests that our 
sample is comprised of relatively large and profitable companies. We also note that the 
mean (median) number of analysts following a firm is approximately ten (eleven).12  
                                            
11 e7.964 = 2.876 (e7.868 = 2.612). 
12 e2.261 = 9.59 (e2.398 = 11.0). 
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In regards to CEO characteristics, we note that the average CEO is 56 years of age, 
with about six years of experience as a CEO, and 63.7% of our CEOs also serve as the 
chairman of the board. Table 2 Panel B presents the Pearson (Spearman) correlations. We 
note that both Post and MTF are positive and significantly correlated with the likelihood 
of issuing a management forecast. Further, we note that 13 of the 16 control variables are 
significantly correlated with the likelihood of forecast issuance. This highlights the 
importance of controlling for these effects in our multivariate setting. We note that the 
Pearson correlation coefficient between Size and LnAnalysts is large and positive, whereas 
the Pearson correlation coefficient between ROA and Loss is large and negative. All other 
variables have correlation coefficients that are less than or equal to 0.45. Table 2 Panel C 
presents the univariate comparison for our variables split by transition type (i.e. male-to-
female transitions versus male-to-male transitions). We find that firms with male-to-female 
CEO transitions have a higher likelihood of issuing a management forecast than firms with 
male-to-male CEO transitions. We also note that significant differences exist among 
numerous control variables, which further indicates the importance of utilizing a 
multivariate setting to perform our analysis. 
-------------INSERT TABLE 2 HERE----------------- 
 Table 3 presents descriptive statistics, correlations, and univariate comparisons for 
the revision sample. Table 3 Panel A presents the descriptive statistics. We note that the 
mean (median) analyst forecast revision is 0.001 (0.001) and the mean (median) change in 
expectations is 0.004 (0.001). We note that the mean (median) total assets for our revision 
sample is $4.573 ($4.243) billion and only 9.2% of firms report a loss, which suggests that 
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our sample is comprised of relatively large and profitable companies.13 Table 3 Panel B 
presents the Pearson (Spearman) correlations for our sample. We note that seven of the 
thirteen variables are correlated with Revision. Table 3 Panel C presents the univariate 
comparison for our variables split by transition type. We again note that significant 
differences exist across all of our control variables, highlighting the importance of 
performing our analysis in a multivariate setting.    
-------------INSERT TABLE 3 HERE----------------- 
Primary Results 
 Table 4 presents the results related to hypothesis 1a. Specifically, Table 4 presents 
the results of estimating equation (1), which examines whether gender affects the 
likelihood of issuing a management earnings forecast. In column 1, we present the results 
including only the control variables. In column 2, we then add in the variables Post and 
MTF and find that both are statistically insignificant. In column 3, we then include the 
interaction term Post × MTF and find a positive (6.036) and significant (p = 0.048) 
coefficient. The positive coefficient on the interaction term is consistent with hypothesis 
1a and provides evidence that women CEOs are more likely to issue earnings forecasts 
than their men CEO counterparts after a CEO transition. This finding is consistent with 
women CEOs being more transparent than men CEOs.  In addition, we note that the signs 
and significance on the control variables generally align with those in prior studies (e.g., 
Hribar and Yang 2016). In particular, we note that LnAnalysts and Size are both positive 
and significant.   
-------------INSERT TABLE 4 HERE----------------- 
                                            
13 e8.428 = 4.573 (e8.353 = 4.243). 
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 Tables 5, 6 and 7 present the results of estimating equation (2) related to our 
hypothesis 1b. In Table 5, we first examine whether gender affects the likelihood of 
missing management forecasts. In column 3, we find that Post and MTF are statistically 
insignificant. Furthermore, we find that the interaction term (Post × MTF) is statistically 
insignificant, inconsistent with hypothesis 1b. This finding suggests that women CEOs are 
no less or no more likely than men CEOs to miss their good news management earnings 
forecasts.  
-------------INSERT TABLE 5 HERE----------------- 
 In Table 6, we next examine whether gender affects the bias in good news 
management earnings forecasts. In column 3, we again note that Post and MTF are 
statistically insignificant. Inconsistent with hypothesis 1b, we also find that Post × MTF is 
statistically insignificant. This finding suggests that good news forecasts issued by women 
CEOs are no more or no less optimistically biased then good news forecasts issued by men 
CEOs.   
 -------------INSERT TABLE 6 HERE----------------- 
 Lastly, in Table 7, we examine whether gender affects the precision of good news 
management earnings forecasts. In column 3, we continue to document statistically 
insignificant coefficients on Post and MTF. Furthermore, we find that the coefficient on 
the interaction term, Post × MTF, is statistically insignificant. This finding is also 
inconsistent with hypothesis 1b and suggests that good news management earnings 
forecasts by women CEOs are no less or no more precise then men CEOs. In sum, despite 
men and women CEOs differing on the likelihood of issuing earnings forecasts, we do not 
observe any difference related to the properties of those forecasts, inconsistent with 
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hypothesis 1b. In other words, if good news management earnings forecasts are issued, 
men and women CEOs exhibit no statistical difference in the quality of those forecasts.  
-------------INSERT TABLE 7 HERE----------------- 
Next, we examine how analysts and investors respond to management earnings 
forecasts by estimating equation (3). In Table 8, we first present the results examining 
whether CEO gender affects analysts’ response to good news management earnings 
forecasts. Consistent with hypothesis 2, we find that the interaction term, ∆Expectations × 
Post × MTF, is negative (-85.845) and statistically significant (p = 0.000) in column 5. 
This suggests that analysts’ temper down their reactions to good news management 
earnings forecasts from women CEOs.   
-------------INSERT TABLE 8 HERE----------------- 
We next present the results of whether CEO gender affects investors’ response to 
management earnings forecasts in Table 9. We note that several control variables are 
statistically significant, including Horizon, Size, and RetVol. In column 3, we document a 
negative (-647.171) and statistically significant effect (p = 0.000) on the interaction term, 
∆Expectations × Post × MTF, consistent with hypothesis 2. This suggests that investors, 
like analysts, exhibit tempered reactions to good news management earnings forecasts from 
women CEOs compared to those from men CEOs.  
-------------INSERT TABLE 9 HERE----------------- 
 In sum, our results suggest that while women CEOs are more forthcoming and 
transparent in issuing management forecasts, they issue forecasts that do not differ in 
forecast properties from men CEOs. However, analysts and investors demonstrate a 
markedly tempered reaction to the forecasts if they are provided by a woman CEO. This 
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finding provides support for the argument that analysts and investors perceive the forecasts 
from women CEOs to be less credible and thus respond accordingly. Therefore, this finding 
of a tempered reaction suggests a skeptical bias toward women CEOs on the part of analysts 
and investors in as much as the forecast properties do not differ.  
5. Additional Analyses  
Bad News Forecasts 
 The focus of our analyses so far is on the issuance of good news management 
forecasts. In this section, we examine whether our results are robust for the sample of firms 
that issue bad news management forecasts. To perform these analyses, we rerun our tests 
for Tables 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9 for the sample of firms that issue bad news management 
forecasts. In terms of forecast properties, in untabulated analyses, we continue to find that 
the interaction term (Post × MTF) is insignificant for Precision and OptBias. This indicates 
that bad news forecasts issued by women CEOs are no less precise and no more biased 
than bad news forecasts issued by men CEOs. However, we document a negative (-15.616) 
and significant (p = 0.090) effect of Post × MTF for the regression with Miss as the 
dependent variable. This suggests that women CEOs are less likely to miss bad news 
forecasts than men CEOs. Next, with regards to analysts’ reactions, we find that the 
interaction term, ΔExpectations × Post × MTF, is negative (-50.688) and statistically 
significant (p = 0.085, one-tailed). This provides some support for the argument that 
analysts exhibit a muted effect in their revisions based on the magnitude of bad news from 
women CEOs. Finally, with regard to investors’ reactions, we find that the interaction term, 
ΔExpectations × Post × MTF, is negative (-344.494) and statistically significant (p = 0.051, 
one-tailed). This again provides evidence that investors also temper their reactions to 
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women CEOs bad news management forecasts. Overall, the results of these additional 
analyses in conjunction with our primary analyses of good news forecast results suggest 
that forecasts issued by female CEOs, as well as analyst and investor responses to such 
forecasts, do not differ depending on whether the forecast contains good or bad news.  
Disclosure of Bad News 
Kothari et al. (2009) find that managers delay the release of bad news relative to 
good news. One potential explanation for the muted response by analysts and investors to 
earnings forecasts issued by women CEOs is that women CEOs withhold bad news. 
Therefore, we next explore whether women CEOs are more likely to withhold bad news 
relative to men CEOs.  To perform this analysis, we adopt the model in Kothari et al. (2009) 
and add an indicator variable for whether the firm has a woman CEO. Additionally, we 
include an interaction between Female and Bad, where Bad is an indicator variable equal 
to 1 when the management forecast of earnings per share is lower than the mean analyst 
forecast for analyst forecasts issued in the 90 days preceding the management earnings 
forecast. In untabulated analyses, we fail to find that women CEOs exhibit any differential 
bad news withholding behavior. We then run multiple additional iterations of the models 
found in Kothari et al. (2009), yet we continue to find undifferentiated bad news 
withholding by women CEOs relative to men CEOs. Overall, the results of these analyses 
suggest that women CEOs are no more or no less likely to withhold bad news relative to 
men CEOs. Thus, analysts’ and investors’ muted response does not appear to be the result 
of withholding bad news.    
Brokerage Reputation and Analyst Experience 
 In this section, we seek to provide a potential explanation for the analysts’ tempered 
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response to forecasts issued by women CEOs. Prior research documents that analysts’ 
experience and brokerage reputation affect the accuracy of analysts’ forecasts (e.g., 
Mikhail et al. 1997; Corwin et al. 2017). Therefore, we examine whether the downward 
revisions to forecasts from women CEOs is impacted by analyst experience (AnalystExp) 
and brokerage reputation (BrokerageRep). AnalystExp is defined by how long the analyst 
has followed the firm in years. BrokerageRep is an indicator variable equal to one if the 
analyst works for a brokerage in the top 25 investment banks and zero otherwise (Corwin 
et al. 2017). To perform this analysis, we adapt equation (3) to include both a level term of 
AnalystExp or BrokerageRep, two-way interactions of Female × AnalystExp 
(BrokerageRep) and ΔExpectations × AnalystExp (BrokerageRep) as well as a three-way 
interaction of Female × AnalystExp (BrokerageRep) × ΔExpectations. In untabulated 
analyses, we find that the differential reaction by analysts with respect to CEO gender is 
not explained by analyst experience or brokerage reputation.  
Trading Volume 
In this section, we examine a potential explanation for investors’ muted response 
to forecasts issued by women CEOs. Prior research suggests that trading volume can be 
indicative of disagreement among investors (e.g., Karpoff 1986; Kim and Verrecchia 
1991). Therefore, we examine whether investors demonstrate greater disagreement for 
firms with women CEOs. Specifically, we examine whether the level of trading volume is 
impacted by whether or not the firm has a woman CEO. To perform this analysis, we adapt 
the model from Bamber et al. (1997) and include an indicator variable for whether the firm 
has a woman CEO. In untabulated analyses, we do not find a differential effect for women 
CEOs. We run multiple iterations of this test as in Bamber et al. (1997); however, Female 
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is statistically insignificant in every iteration. This suggests that investors do not exhibit 
more disagreement in their trading behavior for firms with women CEOs compared to men 
CEOs. Overall, the results of this analysis suggest that investor disagreement does not 
explain why we document a tempered reaction by investors to good news forecasts issued 
by women CEOs. 
Bundling with Earnings Announcement 
Baginski, Campbell, Ryu, and Warren (2019) find that almost 90 percent of 
management earnings forecasts are issued simultaneously with earnings announcements. 
In this section we examine not only the rate of bundled forecasts, but also whether the rate 
of bundling differs between men and women CEOs. In untabulated analyses, we find that 
71.9% of management forecasts in our sample are bundled together with earnings 
announcements. While this rate of bundling is high, we note that it is substantially lower 
than that in Baginski et al. (2019). Further, we find that the rate of bundling of forecasts 
and earnings announcements does not differ between men and women CEOs. This provides 
some support that our findings are not driven by differences in bundling between men and 
women CEOs.  
6. Conclusion 
In this study, we examine the role of CEO gender in shaping management earnings 
forecast issuance and properties. Further, we analyze analyst and investor reaction to 
earnings forecasts issued by women and men CEOs. First, we find that women CEOs are 
more likely than men CEOs to issue earnings forecasts. This finding is consistent with 
previous research that finds that women CEOs tend to be more forthcoming and transparent 
with regard to firm management (Glass and Cook 2016b). Second, we find no statistical 
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difference in the properties of earnings forecasts issued by men and women CEOs. Further 
analyses reveal that this lack of difference extends to bad news forecasts; women CEOs 
are no more or less likely to withhold bad news from shareholders. Finally, we find that 
while women CEOs forecast properties do not differ from those of men CEOs, analysts 
and investors demonstrate a markedly tempered reaction to the forecasts issued by  women 
CEOs. Further analyses reveal that the greater skepticism displayed by external market 
actors cannot be explained by bad news withholding, analyst experience, brokerage 
reputation, or investor disagreement.  
The reaction of analysts and investors to management forecasts is a reflection of 
the perceived credibility they grant to management forecasts (Jennings 1987). Thus, these 
reactions represent market actors’ assessment of the legitimacy of firm-issued forecasts. 
The tempered reaction to forecasts issued by women CEOs as compared to men CEOs 
suggests that market actors may be more likely to question women CEO’s competence or 
capability with regard to firm financial performance. Evidence of potential bias against 
women CEOs is underscored by our findings that the properties of forecasts issued by 
women and men CEOs do not differ. Thus, while women CEOs are more likely than men 
to issue earnings forecasts, this transparency is not rewarded by market assessments. 
Previous research finds that women leaders are subject to a burden of doubt with 
regard to their capability (Eagly and Carli 2007). Their competence, particularly with 
regard to financial decisions, is often viewed with skepticism (Schubert et al. 1999). Such 
bias has led to significant challenges for women CEOs including glass cliff appointments 
(Cook and Glass 2014a) and threats from activist shareholders (Gupta et al. 2019). Our 
findings suggest that such bias may extend to the reaction of analysts and investors to 
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voluntary financial disclosures by firms led by women CEOs. Such bias may harm firms 
by downgrading the expected performance by external market actors and by undermining 
the legitimacy of financial disclosures offered by women CEOs. 
While our analysis reveals important gender dynamics with regard to earnings 
forecasts, there are limitations to our study that can be addressed by future research. First, 
our analysis is limited to women CEOs, who remain underrepresented relative to men in 
senior leadership positions. Future research could consider the impact of race/ethnicity on 
forecast issuance and properties as well as investor and analyst reaction. Such a study may 
reveal whether and how market actors respond to CEOs from other underrepresented 
groups. Second, our study is focused on U.S. firms. Future research could explore whether 
there are similar tempered reactions by market actors to women CEOs in non-U.S. 
contexts. Finally, our study is limited to market actor reactions to earnings forecasts. Future 
research could broaden the scope to explore additional measures of assessment of CEO 
competence and capability including stock price reaction to strategic investments or 
internal restructuring. 
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Appendix 1 
Variable Definitions  
Variable Definition 
Age Age in years of the CEO. 
CAR 
The three-day cumulative abnormal return centered on the management 
earnings forecast. The individual day abnormal returns for each security 
are formed by summing the individual day abnormal return (raw return 
less the corresponding decile size return).  
ChgEarn Change in earnings in year t, scaled by year-end price. 
Conc 
Industry concentration ratio measured as the sum of revenue for the top 
five firms in its two-digit SIC code, scaled by the sum of revenue for all 
firms in its two-digit SIC code. 
Cover 
The natural log of the number of analysts covering the firm in the ninety 
days preceding the management forecast announcement. 
Dacc 
Discretionary accruals in year t estimated from the modified Jones 
model (Dechow et al. 1995). 
Dual 
Indicator variable equal to 1 if the CEO’s title in Execucomp also 
includes Chairman of the Board. 
EarnVol 
The standard deviation of income before extraordinary items scaled by 
assets over 5 years ending in year t. 
EquityIssue 
An indicator variable equal to one if the firm issued shares in year t, and 
zero otherwise. 
Experience 
Number of years the CEO has been listed as the CEO of the same firm 
or another firm included in the Execucomp database.   
Horizon 
Forecast horizon measured as the natural log of the number of days 
between management forecast issuance and the end of the forecasted 
period. 
InvMills 
The inverse Mill’s ratio estimated from the first stage of the Heckman 
(1979) model. 
Issue 
An indicator variable equal to one if the firm issued at least one forecast 
in year t, and zero otherwise. 
LitRisk 
Probability of litigation estimated using the probit model in Rogers and 
Stocken (2005). 
LnAnalysts The natural log of the number of analysts following in year t. 
Loss 
An indicator variable equal to one if the firm reported a loss in year t 
for the forecast issuance and characteristics tests and year t -1 for the 
revision and market reaction tests, and zero otherwise. 
M&A 
An indicator variable equal to one if the firm’s annual acquisition or 
merger-related costs exceeded 5 percent of net income (loss) in year t, 
and zero otherwise. 
Miss 
An indicator variable equal to one if actual earnings is less than the 
management forecast, and zero otherwise. For range forecasts, Miss = 
1 if actual earnings is less than the lower bound of the range estimate. 
MTB 
Market-to-book in year t for the forecast issuance and characteristics 
tests and year t -1 for the revision and market reaction tests. 
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MTF Indicator variable equal to 1 for male-to-female CEO transitions. 
News 
Management forecast minus prevailing analysts’ consensus, scaled by 
logged assets per share. We use the midpoint of range forecasts. 
OptBias 
Management forecast less realized earnings, scaled by logged assets per 
share. We use the midpoint of range forecasts. 
Post 
Indicator variable equal to 1 for the three years following the CEO 
transition. The year of the CEO transition is removed from the sample. 
Precision 
Negative one multiplied by the absolute value of the forecast range, 
scaled by logged assets per share. 
RetVol 
Standard deviation of the stock return over the six months prior to the 
management forecast date. 
Revision 
The revised individual analyst earnings forecast less the prior earnings 
forecast scaled by price two days prior to the forecast revision. 
Roa 
Return on assets defined as income before extraordinary items scaled 
by total assets in year t. 
ShrOwn Percentage of shares outstanding owned by the CEO in year t. 
Size 
Natural log of the firm’s assets in year t for the forecast issuance and 
characteristics tests and year t -1 for the revision and market reaction 
tests. 
StdEarn 
Standard deviation of quarterly return on assets over the preceding 
twelve quarters. 
Vested 
The CEO’s holdings of unexercised exercisable options over total 
shares outstanding in year t, multiplied by 10. 
Weak 
An indicator variable equal to one if the firm reported a material 
weakness during the sample period, and zero otherwise. 
ΔExpectations 
The management forecast less the prevailing analyst consensus 
(consisting of the last forecast for each analyst on I/B/E/S in the 90 days 
preceding the management forecast) scaled by price two days prior to 
the management forecast announcement date. We use the midpoint of 
range forecasts. 
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Appendix 2 
Male-to-Female CEO transitions 
 
Company Name
Transition 
Fiscal Year
Male CEO Female CEO
1 Aspect Communications Corporation 2000 James R. Carreker Beatriz V. Infante
2 Bombay Company Incorporated 2000 Robert S. Jackson Carmie Mehrlander
3 HP Incorporated 2000 Lewis E. Platt Carleton S. Fiorina
4 Lee Enterprises Incorporated 2001 Richard D. Gottlieb Mary E. Junck
5 Quintiles Transnational Corporation 2001 Dennis B. Gillings Pamela J. Kirby
6 SFN Group Incorporated 2001 Raymond Marcy Cinda A. Hallman
7 Southern Company Gas 2001 Walter M. Higgins, III Paula G. Rosput
8 VISX Incorporated 2001 Mark B. Logan Elizabeth H. Davila
9 Axcelis Technologies Incorporated 2002 Brian R. Bachman Mary G. Puma
10 DineEquity Incorporated 2002 Richard K. Herzer Julia A. Stewart
11 Edgewater Technology Incorporated 2002 Clete T. Brewer Shirley Singleton
12 Xerox Corporation 2002 Paul A. Allaire Anne M. Mulcahy
13 Advent Software Incorporated 2003 Peter M. Caswell Stephanie G. DiMarco
14 Banta Corporation 2003 Donald D. Belcher Stephanie A. Streeter
15 Rite Aid Corporation 2003 Robert G. Miller Mary F. Sammons
16 Books-A-Million Incorporated 2004 Clyde B. Anderson Sandra Brophy Cochran
17 Frontier Communications Corporation 2005 Leonard Tow Mary Agnes Wilderotter
18 Hancock Fabrics Incorporated 2005 Larry G. Kirk Jane F. Aggers
19 New York Times Company 2005 Russell T. Lewis Janet L. Robinson
20 Reynolds American Incorporated 2005 Andrew J. Schindler Susan M. Cameron
21 Ann Incorporated 2006 J. Patrick Spainhour Katherine Lawther Krill
22 Hawaiian Electric Industries 2006 Robert F. Clarke Constance Hee Lau
23 Hillshire Brands Company 2006 C. Steven McMillan Brenda C. Barnes
24 Jack In The Box Incorporated 2006 Robert J. Nugent Linda A. Lang
25 Mondelez International Incorporated 2006 Roger K. Deromedi Irene B. Rosenfeld
26 Anthem Incorporated 2007 Larry C. Glasscock Angela F. Braly
27 Archer Daniels Midland Company 2007 G. Allen Andreas Patricia A. Woertz
28 Carptenter Technology Corporation 2007 Robert J. Torcolini Anne L. Stevens, Ph.D., B.Sc.
29 LTC Properties Incorporated 2007 Andre C. Dimitriadis, Ph.D. Wendy L. Simpson
30 PepsiCo Incorporated 2007 Steven S. Reinemund Indra K. Nooyi, M.P.P.M.
31 RTI International Metals Incorporated 2007 Timothy G. Rupert Dawne S. Hickton, Esq.
32 Belo Corporation 2008 Robert W. Decherd Dunia A. Shive
33 Blue Nile Incorporated 2008 Mark C. Vadon Diane M. Irvine
34 MTS Systems Corporation 2008 Sidney W. Emery, Jr., Ph.D. Laura B. Hamilton
35 Sunoco Incorporated 2008 John G. Drosdick Lynn Laverty Elsenhans
36 Wilshire Bancorp Incorporated 2008 Soo Bong Min Joanne Kim
37 Altaba Incorporated 2009 Chih-Yuan Yang Carol A. Bartz, Ph.D.
38 American Equity Investmentt Life Holding Company 2009 David Jeff Noble Wendy C. Waugaman
39 Du Pont (E I) de Nemours 2009 Charles O. Holliday, Jr. Ellen J. Kullman
40 Ingredion Incorporated 2009 Samuel C. Scott, III Ilene S. Gordon
41 Standard Microsystems Corporation 2009 Steven J. Bilodeau Christine King
42 Arcbest Corporation 2010 Robert A. Davidson Judy R. McReynolds
43 Childrens Place Incorporated 2010 Charles K. Crovitz Jane T. Elfers
44 Dun & Bradstreet Corporation 2010 Steven W. Alesio Sara Mathew
45 International Game Technology 2010 Thomas J. Matthews Patti Sarles Hart
46 International Speedway Corporation 2010 James C. France Lesa France Kennedy
47 PNM Resources Incorporated 2010 Jeffry E. Sterba Patricia K. Vincent-Collawn
48 Tredegar Corporation 2010 John D. Gottwald Nancy M. Taylor
49 Williams-Sonoma Incorporated 2010 W. Howard Lester Laura J. Alber
50 Caleres Incorporated 2011 Ronald A. Fromm Diane M. Sullivan
51 CDI Corporation 2011 Roger H. Ballou H. Paulett Eberhart
52 KeyCorporation 2011 Henry L. Meyer, III Beth E. Mooney
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Company Name
Transition 
Fiscal Year
Male CEO Female CEO
53 Neustar Incorporated 2011 Jeffrey E. Ganek Lisa A. Hook
54 Sempra Energy 2011 Donald E. Felsinger Debra L. Reed
55 Alliant Energy Corporation 2012 William D. Harvey Patricia Leonard Kampling
56 Ambac Financial Group Incorporated 2012 David W. Wallis Diana N. Adams
57 Benchmark Electronics Incorporated 2012 Cary T. Fu Gayla J. Delly
58 Campbell Soup Company 2012 Douglas R. Conant Denise M. Morrison
59 Cracker Barrel Old Country Store 2012 Michael A. Woodhouse Sandra Brophy Cochran
60 International Business Machines Corporation 2012 Samuel J. Palmisano Virginia M. Rometty
61 ITT Incorporated 2012 Steven R. Loranger Denise L. Ramos
62 Libbey Incorporated 2012 John F. Meier Stephanie A. Streeter
63 Mylan N.V. 2012 Robert J. Coury Heather Bresch
64 Navigant Consulting Incorporated 2012 William M. Goodyear Julie M. Howard
65 Select Comfort Corporation 2012 William R. McLaughlin Shelly R. Ibach
66 Simpson Manufacturing Incorporated 2012 Thomas J. Fitzmyers Karen W. Colonias
67 Spire Incorporated 2012 Douglas H. Yaeger Suzanne Sitherwood
68 Tegna Incorporated 2012 Craig A. Dubow Gracia C. Martore
69 Clearwater Paper Corporation 2013 Gordon L. Jones Linda K. Massman
70 Convergys Corporation 2013 Jeffrey H. Fox Andrea J. Ayers
71 Duke Energy Corporation 2013 James E. Rogers, Jr. Lynn J. Good
72 General Dynamics Corporation 2013 Jay L. Johnson Phebe N. Novakovic
73 Lockheed Martin Corporation 2013 Robert J. Stevens Marillyn A. Hewson
74 Nutrisystem Incorporated 2013 Joseph M. Redling Dawn M. Zier
75 Ulta Beauty Incorporated 2013 Carl S. Rubin Mary N. Dillon
76 General Motors Company 2014 Daniel Francis Akerson Mary T. Barra
77 HCP Incorporated 2014 James F. Flaherty, III, CPA Lauralee E. Martin
78 Horace Mann Educators Corporation 2014 Peter H. Heckman Marita Zuraitis
79 Reynolds American Incorporated 2014 Daniel M. Delen Susan M. Cameron
80 Ross Stores Incorporated 2014 Michael Balmuth Barbara Rentler
81 Tootsie Roll Industries Incorporated 2014 Melvin J. Gordon Ellen R. Gordon
82 WEX Incorporated 2014 Michael E. Dubyak Melissa D. Smith
83 Advanced Micro Devices 2015 Rory P. Read Lisa T. Su
84 Amerisafe Incorporated 2015 Clifford Allen Bradley, Jr. Gerry Janelle Frost
85 Central Pacific Financial Corporation 2015 John C. Dean, Jr. Anli Ngo
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Table 1: Sample Selection  
 
 
There are 29 Female-to-Male CEO transitions and 1 Female-to-Female transition over the 2000 to 
2015 period.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Male-to-Female CEO 
Transitions
Male-to-Male CEO 
Transitions
Number of CEO transitions on 
ExecuComp database from 2000 to 
2015 meeting sample selection criteria  
85 2,027
CEO transitions included in issuance 
test (Table 4)
59 1,285
CEO transitions included in Table 5 18 419
CEO transitions included in analyst 
revision test (Table 7)
28 595
CEO transitions included in market test 
(Table 8)
47 1,029
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Panel A: Issuance Sample Descriptive Statistics
N Mean Median Std Dev
Issue 12,144 0.439 0.000 0.496
Post 12,144 0.483 0.000 0.500
MTF 12,144 0.043 0.000 0.203
LnAnalysts 12,144 2.261 2.398 0.880
Size 12,144 7.964 7.868 1.753
EarnVol 12,144 0.053 0.025 0.080
LitRisk 12,144 0.189 0.014 0.323
ChgEarn 12,144 -0.069 0.324 33.289
MTB 12,144 2.789 2.045 3.549
EquityIssue 12,144 0.853 1.000 0.354
M&A 12,144 0.063 0.000 0.244
Weak 12,144 0.285 0.000 0.451
Roa 12,144 0.032 0.040 0.102
Loss 12,144 0.183 0.000 0.386
ShrOwn 12,144 0.277 0.037 0.384
Vested 12,144 5.646 2.933 7.561
Age 12,144 56.407 57.000 7.104
Dual 12,144 0.637 1.000 0.481
Experience 12,144 5.888 3.751 5.968
Table 2: Issuance Sample Descriptive Statistics
Summary statistics for the variables used in our management forecast sample. All variables are 
defined in the Appendix.
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Panel B: Issuance Sample Correlations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19)
Issue  (1) 0.03 0.04 0.14 0.16 -0.21 -0.01 0.00 0.16 0.07 0.04 -0.05 0.19 -0.19 -0.08 0.01 0.00 0.08 -0.02
Post (2) 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.02 0.06 0.04 -0.02 -0.01 0.08 0.00 -0.02 0.01 0.02 -0.15 -0.37 -0.20 -0.49
MTF  (3) 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.03 -0.03 0.02 -0.01 -0.04 0.01 -0.01
LnAnalysts  (4) 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.61 -0.11 0.40 0.10 0.23 0.04 0.01 -0.19 0.18 -0.13 -0.18 -0.19 -0.01 0.13 0.05
Size  (5) 0.15 0.04 0.01 0.59 -0.43 0.10 0.12 -0.02 -0.10 0.03 -0.20 -0.05 -0.17 -0.25 -0.32 0.11 0.21 0.05
EarnVol  (6) -0.20 0.02 -0.01 -0.15 -0.36 0.28 -0.02 -0.01 0.03 0.04 0.13 -0.12 0.42 0.10 0.17 -0.14 -0.17 -0.06
LitRisk  (7) -0.11 0.01 0.00 0.27 -0.01 0.24 -0.04 0.02 0.11 0.05 0.01 0.01 0.13 0.10 -0.02 -0.13 -0.07 -0.01
ChgEarn  (8) -0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 -0.05 0.14 0.01 -0.07 -0.03 0.28 -0.27 -0.05 -0.04 0.02 0.04 -0.01
MTB  (9) 0.08 -0.02 0.02 0.14 -0.02 0.02 0.00 0.03 0.12 -0.02 -0.11 0.50 -0.26 -0.10 -0.05 -0.03 0.07 0.00
EquityIssue  (10) 0.07 -0.01 0.01 0.05 -0.09 0.02 0.05 0.01 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.13 -0.06 -0.01 0.12 -0.05 0.01 0.02
M&A  (11) 0.04 0.08 -0.01 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.02 -0.02 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.13 0.04 0.08 -0.04 -0.05 -0.05 -0.01
Weak  (12) -0.05 0.00 -0.01 -0.18 -0.19 0.12 0.04 -0.01 -0.08 0.00 -0.01 -0.14 0.13 0.06 0.09 -0.05 -0.09 -0.03
Roa (13) 0.17 -0.01 0.03 0.18 0.12 -0.45 -0.09 0.23 0.21 0.07 -0.05 -0.12 -0.67 -0.02 -0.08 0.04 0.09 0.03
Loss  (14) -0.19 0.01 -0.03 -0.15 -0.18 0.39 0.18 -0.19 -0.12 -0.06 0.04 0.13 -0.67 0.05 0.11 -0.08 -0.13 -0.04
ShrOwn  (15) -0.07 0.01 0.01 -0.16 -0.23 0.07 0.06 -0.02 -0.05 0.00 0.07 0.06 -0.03 0.06 0.19 0.04 -0.09 0.14
Vested  (16) -0.01 -0.17 -0.01 -0.22 -0.35 0.15 0.01 -0.01 -0.03 0.07 -0.03 0.10 -0.13 0.11 0.17 -0.01 0.07 0.16
Age (17) -0.01 -0.35 -0.03 -0.02 0.11 -0.13 -0.10 0.01 -0.04 -0.06 -0.04 -0.05 0.07 -0.08 0.04 0.00 0.27 0.38
Dual (18) 0.08 -0.20 0.01 0.13 0.21 -0.15 -0.07 0.01 0.04 0.01 -0.05 -0.09 0.10 -0.13 -0.08 0.04 0.27 0.24
Experience (19) -0.04 -0.43 -0.02 0.02 0.01 -0.04 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.02 -0.02 0.01 0.04 -0.03 0.13 0.13 0.41 0.22
Numbers in bold indicate statistical significance at the 1 percent level. Spearman (Pearson) correlation coefficients are presented above (below) the 
diagonal. All variables are defined in the Appendix.
Table 2: Issuance Sample Descriptive Statistics (Continued)
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Table 2: Issuance Sample Descriptive Statistics (Continued) 
 
Panel C: Issuance Sample Descriptive Statistics by Transition Type   
 
The 522 (11,622) observations reflect up to 6 event years (3 years before and 3 years after the 
management transition) for 97 (2,174) male-to-female (male-to-male) CEO transitions with 
sufficient data for the independent and dependent variables. *, **, *** Denote coefficients 
statistically different from zero at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively (p-
values are given as two-tailed). All variables are defined in the Appendix. 
 
  
N Mean N Mean p-value
Issue 522 0.531 11,622 0.434 0.096 *** 0.000
Post 522 0.494 11,622 0.482 0.012 0.593
LnAnalysts 522 2.282 11,622 2.260 0.021 0.585
Size 522 8.055 11,622 7.960 0.095 0.243
EarnVol 522 0.050 11,622 0.053 -0.003 0.346
LitRisk 522 0.187 11,622 0.189 -0.002 0.900
ChgEarn 522 1.119 11,622 -0.122 1.242 0.461
MTB 522 3.102 11,622 2.775 0.328 * 0.099
EquityIssue 522 0.870 11,622 0.853 0.017 0.258
M&A 522 0.054 11,622 0.064 -0.010 0.310
Weak 522 0.272 11,622 0.285 -0.013 0.514
Roa 522 0.045 11,622 0.031 0.014 *** 0.000
Loss 522 0.134 11,622 0.185 -0.051 *** 0.001
ShrOwn 522 0.295 11,622 0.276 0.019 0.261
Vested 522 5.312 11,622 5.661 -0.349 0.273
Age 522 55.448 11,622 56.450 -1.001 *** 0.001
Dual 522 0.651 11,622 0.637 0.015 0.494
Experience 522 5.320 11,622 5.913 -0.593 *** 0.008
Male-to-Female Male-to-Male
Difference
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Panel A: Revision Sample Descriptive Statistics
N Mean Median Std Dev
Revision 11,414 0.001 0.001 0.008
ΔExpectations 11,414 0.004 0.001 0.008
Post 11,414 0.518 1.000 0.500
MTF 11,414 0.071 0.000 0.256
Horizon 11,414 5.156 5.505 0.785
Size 11,414 8.428 8.353 1.634
MTB 11,414 3.659 2.820 3.983
Loss 11,414 0.092 0.000 0.289
Cover 11,414 2.543 2.639 0.595
StdEarn 11,414 0.013 0.007 0.018
RetVol 11,414 0.022 0.020 0.011
Age 11,414 55.889 56.000 6.766
Dual 11,414 0.659 1.000 0.474
Experience 11,414 5.514 3.548 5.783
Table 3: Revision Sample Descriptive Statistics
Summary statistics for the variables used in our analyst revision sample. All variables are defined in the 
Appendix.
Panel B: Revision Sample Correlations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)
Revision  (1) 0.30 0.01 0.02 0.06 -0.07 -0.08 0.06 -0.05 0.07 0.10 -0.02 0.00 -0.01
ΔExpectations  (2) 0.05 -0.04 -0.01 0.04 -0.11 -0.23 0.20 -0.14 0.18 0.35 -0.08 -0.05 0.00
Post  (3) 0.04 -0.03 -0.03 0.02 0.07 -0.03 0.06 -0.04 -0.05 -0.10 -0.35 -0.19 -0.66
MTF (4) 0.03 0.02 -0.03 -0.02 0.01 0.07 -0.06 0.05 0.02 -0.07 0.02 0.02 -0.03
Horizon  (5) 0.02 0.06 0.03 -0.09 0.01 0.03 0.00 -0.06 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 0.01 -0.04
Size  (6) -0.03 -0.02 0.07 0.03 -0.12 -0.04 -0.06 0.50 -0.29 -0.40 0.10 0.22 0.01
MTB  (7) 0.00 -0.05 -0.03 0.05 0.03 -0.06 -0.18 0.22 0.10 -0.12 -0.08 0.03 0.02
Loss  (8) -0.02 0.21 0.06 -0.06 0.04 -0.06 -0.08 -0.03 0.32 0.22 -0.04 -0.10 -0.05
Cover  (9) -0.03 -0.05 -0.04 0.05 -0.14 0.48 0.08 -0.03 0.01 -0.15 0.03 0.12 0.10
StdEarn  (10) -0.04 0.16 -0.02 -0.02 0.04 -0.22 0.04 0.40 -0.04 0.34 -0.10 -0.09 0.03
RetVol  (11) 0.04 0.29 -0.08 -0.04 0.01 -0.28 -0.04 0.28 -0.12 0.27 -0.10 -0.09 0.01
Age (12) 0.00 -0.05 -0.35 0.03 -0.11 0.10 -0.05 -0.03 0.02 -0.09 -0.09 0.23 0.41
Dual (13) 0.02 -0.01 -0.19 0.02 -0.07 0.22 0.00 -0.10 0.10 -0.12 -0.07 0.23 0.24
Experience (14) -0.01 0.04 -0.53 -0.04 -0.06 -0.04 -0.01 -0.01 0.05 0.03 0.01 0.46 0.20
Numbers in bold indicate statistical significance at the 1 percent level. Spearman (Pearson) correlation 
coefficients are presented above (below) the diagonal. All variables are defined in the Appendix.
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Table 3 Revision Sample Descriptive Statistics (Continued) 
 
Panel C: Revision Sample Descriptive Statistics by Transition Type 
 
The 806 (10,608) observations reflect analyst revisions over 6 event years (3 years before and 3 years after 
the management transition) for 50 (1,023) male-to-female (male-to-male) CEO transitions with sufficient 
data for the independent and dependent variables. *, **, *** Denote coefficients statistically different from 
zero at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively (p-values are given as two-tailed). All 
variables are defined in the Appendix. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
N Mean N Mean p-value
Revision 806 0.002 10,608 0.001 0.001 *** 0.000
ΔExpectations 806 0.004 10,608 0.004 0.001 * 0.072
Post 806 0.465 10,608 0.522 -0.057 *** 0.002
Horizon 806 4.903 10,608 5.176 -0.273 *** 0.000
Size 806 8.605 10,608 8.415 0.190 *** 0.006
MTB 806 4.364 10,608 3.605 0.760 *** 0.000
Loss 806 0.029 10,608 0.097 -0.068 *** 0.000
Cover 806 2.649 10,608 2.535 0.113 *** 0.000
StdEarn 806 0.011 10,608 0.013 -0.002 *** 0.001
RetVol 806 0.020 10,608 0.022 -0.002 *** 0.000
Age 806 56.562 10,608 55.837 0.725 *** 0.002
Dual 806 0.699 10,608 0.656 0.043 ** 0.011
Experience 806 4.640 10,608 5.581 -0.941 *** 0.000
Difference
Male-to-Female Male-to-Male
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Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error
Post -0.936 (1.13) -1.210 (1.09)
MTF 2.402 (4.53) -0.577 (4.33)
Post  × MTF 6.036 (3.44) **
LnAnalysts 8.383 (1.16) *** 8.371 (1.17) *** 8.367 (1.16) ***
Size 2.586 (0.78) *** 2.589 (0.78) *** 2.586 (0.78) ***
EarnVol -67.634 (8.05) *** -67.669 (8.06) *** -67.686 (8.06) ***
LitRisk -15.003 (2.32) *** -15.043 (2.33) *** -15.014 (2.33) ***
ChgEarn -0.059 (0.02) *** -0.059 (0.02) *** -0.059 (0.02) ***
MTB 0.512 (0.20) ** 0.510 (0.20) ** 0.509 (0.20) **
EquityIssue 1.588 (1.78) 1.577 (1.78) 1.579 (1.78)
M&A 6.894 (1.86) *** 6.949 (1.86) *** 6.935 (1.86) ***
Weak 0.624 (1.87) 0.642 (1.87) 0.644 (1.87)
Roa -0.584 (6.92) -0.550 (6.91) -0.591 (6.91)
Loss -12.394 (1.94) *** -12.389 (1.96) *** -12.377 (1.96) ***
ShrOwn -2.663 (1.94) -2.675 (1.92) -2.654 (1.91)
Vested 0.378 (0.09) *** 0.373 (0.09) *** 0.370 (0.09) ***
Age 0.047 (0.09) 0.036 (0.09) 0.035 (0.09)
Dual 2.152 (1.83) 2.122 (1.83) 2.152 (1.82)
Experience -0.304 (0.12) ** -0.326 (0.13) ** -0.329 (0.13) **
Fixed Effects
Adjusted R
2
0.263 0.263 0.263
Observations 12,144 12,144 12,144
Table 4: Probability of Management Forecast Issuance
Industry/Year Industry/Year Industry/Year
The dependent variable is Issue . Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Standard 
errors are clustered by firm and year. *, **, *** Denote coefficients statistically different from zero 
at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively (unless predicted, p-values are two-
tailed). All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1 percent and 99 percent levels. For 
readability, all of the coefficients and standard errors are multiplied by 100. All variables are defined 
in the Appendix.
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Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error
Post -4.156 (2.42) -4.474 (2.69)
MTF 4.114 (5.39) 0.140 (8.21)
Post  × MTF 8.233 (11.79)
Size -1.745 (1.23) -1.601 (1.19) -1.499 (1.26)
EarnVol -57.054 (44.23) -58.623 (43.93) -59.967 (44.03)
LitRisk 3.325 (6.12) 2.966 (5.92) 2.837 (5.88)
ChgEarn -0.171 (0.04) *** -0.170 (0.05) *** -0.172 (0.05) ***
MTB -1.146 (0.39) *** -1.156 (0.41) ** -1.160 (0.40) ***
EquityIssue 1.571 (3.67) 1.763 (3.79) 1.799 (3.86)
M&A 1.021 (5.80) 1.599 (5.78) 1.756 (5.84)
Weak 6.266 (2.63) ** 6.419 (2.58) ** 6.470 (2.61) **
Roa -89.689 (38.34) ** -88.123 (37.75) ** -88.321 (37.62) **
Loss 7.472 (6.23) 6.987 (6.18) 6.699 (6.30)
Horizon 0.036 (0.01) ** 0.036 (0.01) ** 0.036 (0.01) **
News 145.504 (13.14) *** 144.901 (13.44) *** 144.794 (13.48) ***
Dacc 36.671 (29.27) 34.057 (29.44) 34.414 (29.27)
Conc 15.846 (31.57) 12.210 (28.87) 11.124 (27.83)
Age -0.244 (0.23) -0.319 (0.25) -0.320 (0.25)
Dual -2.265 (3.02) -2.158 (2.99) -2.055 (2.97)
Experience 0.169 (0.44) 0.014 (0.43) 0.012 (0.34)
InvMills -2.007 (11.49) -0.142 (11.66) 0.801 (12.15)
Fixed Effects
Adjusted R
2
0.248 0.249 0.249
Observations 2,276 2,276 2,276
Table 5: Missed Good News Forecasts
Industry/Year Industry/Year Industry/Year
The dependent variable is Miss . Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Standard errors 
are clustered by firm and year. *, **, *** Denote coefficients statistically different from zero at the 
10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively (p-values are two-tailed). All continuous 
variables are winsorized at the 1 percent and 99 percent levels. For readability, all of the coefficients 
and standard errors are multiplied by 100. All variables are defined in the Appendix.
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Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error
Post -7.154 (7.19) -7.236 (7.25)
MTF 12.104 (13.87) 11.075 (14.06)
Post  × MTF 2.131 (8.82)
Size -5.370 (6.39) -5.152 (6.36) -5.125 (6.43)
EarnVol 1,164.166 (1099.35) 1,162.221 (1098.75) 1,161.872 (1098.57)
LitRisk -10.981 (19.77) -11.525 (20.36) -11.558 (20.39)
ChgEarn -1.178 (1.19) -1.176 (1.19) -1.176 (1.20)
MTB 0.350 (1.05) 0.319 (1.02) 0.318 (1.04)
EquityIssue -3.467 (9.56) -3.275 (9.53) -3.266 (9.53)
M&A -46.643 (43.60) -45.504 (42.84) -45.463 (42.82)
Weak 13.624 (14.65) 14.058 (15.03) 14.071 (15.11)
Roa -745.286 (670.12) -743.181 (669.75) -743.236 (669.99)
Loss -92.320 (97.60) -93.200 (98.26) -93.276 (98.38)
Horizon 0.047 (0.05) 0.048 (0.05) 0.048 (0.05)
News 253.123 (117.50) ** 252.144 (117.13) ** 252.116 (117.14) **
Dacc 47.396 (54.72) 42.314 (53.52) 42.407 (53.58)
Conc 209.011 (212.07) 200.725 (205.00) 200.446 (204.78)
Age -1.634 (1.57) -1.758 (1.64) -1.758 (1.64)
Dual 4.190 (7.03) 4.331 (7.09) 4.357 (7.15)
Experience 0.505 (0.84) 0.236 (0.79) 0.235 (0.82)
InvMills -108.303 (101.27) -105.135 (99.52) -104.890 (99.48)
Fixed Effects Industry/Year
Adjusted R
2
0.136 0.135 0.135
Observations 2,272 2,272 2,272
Table 6: Good News Forecast Bias
Industry/Year Industry/Year
The dependent variable is OptBias . Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Standard 
errors are clustered by firm and year. *, **, *** Denote coefficients statistically different from zero at 
the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively (p-values are two-tailed). All continuous 
variables are winsorized at the 1 percent and 99 percent levels. For readability, all of the coefficients 
and standard errors are multiplied by 100. All variables are defined in the Appendix.
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Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error
Post 0.046 (0.22) 0.065 (0.23)
MTF -0.602 (0.34) -0.303 (0.35)
Post  × MTF -0.576 (0.52)
Size -0.160 (0.12) -0.164 (0.11) -0.169 (0.11)
EarnVol -5.350 (3.20) -5.337 (3.16) -5.249 (3.18)
LitRisk -0.890 (0.56) -0.873 (0.55) -0.866 (0.55)
ChgEarn -0.010 (0.01) * -0.010 (0.01) -0.009 (0.01)
MTB 0.008 (0.02) 0.007 (0.02) 0.008 (0.02)
EquityIssue -0.177 (0.29) -0.171 (0.29) -0.175 (0.29)
M&A 0.558 (0.26) ** 0.535 (0.27) * 0.526 (0.27) *
Weak -0.202 (0.36) -0.221 (0.35) -0.223 (0.36)
Roa 8.661 (2.51) *** 8.668 (2.50) *** 8.694 (2.50) ***
Loss -0.640 (0.74) -0.637 (0.72) -0.615 (0.72)
Horizon -0.006 (0.00) *** -0.006 (0.00) *** -0.006 (0.00) ***
News -3.384 (1.52) ** -3.385 (1.53) ** -3.380 (1.53) **
Dacc -3.708 (2.23) -3.637 (2.20) -3.660 (2.19)
Conc -1.913 (2.36) -1.563 (2.22) -1.474 (2.20)
Age -0.014 (0.01) -0.014 (0.01) -0.014 (0.01)
Dual 0.070 (0.27) 0.066 (0.27) 0.057 (0.28)
Experience -0.016 (0.03) -0.013 (0.04) -0.013 (0.04)
InvMills -0.238 (1.27) -0.285 (1.20) -0.344 (1.21)
Fixed Effects
Adjusted R
2
0.283 0.283 0.283
Observations 1,848 1,848 1,848
Table 7: Good News Management Forecast Precision
Industry/Year Industry/Year Industry/Year
The dependent variable is Precision . Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Standard 
errors are clustered by firm and year. *, **, *** Denote coefficients statistically different from zero 
at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively (p-values are two-tailed). All 
continuous variables are winsorized at the 1 percent and 99 percent levels. For readability, all of the 
coefficients and standard errors are multiplied by 100. All variables are defined in the Appendix.
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Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error
ΔExpectations -0.350 (9.19) -15.013 (15.70) -17.232 (16.03)
Post 0.082 (0.07) -0.002 (0.05) -0.025 (0.06)
MTF 0.095 (0.04) ** 0.102 (0.05) ** -0.099 (0.06)
∆Exp. × Post 26.101 (14.11) * 32.253 (15.61) *
∆Exp. × MTF  22.945 (12.93) * 77.121 (14.80) ***
Post × MTF -0.228 (0.09) ** 0.122 (0.06) **
∆Exp. × Post × MTF -85.845 (16.44) ***
Horizon 0.008 (0.02) 0.013 (0.02) 0.011 (0.03)
Size -0.018 (0.01) -0.010 (0.01) -0.011 (0.02)
MTB 0.002 (0.00) 0.002 (0.00) 0.003 (0.01)
Loss -0.046 (0.16) -0.070 (0.16) -0.085 (0.16)
Cover -0.030 (0.03) -0.033 (0.03) -0.024 (0.05)
StdEarn -2.577 (1.48) * -2.390 (1.36) * -2.421 (1.26) *
RetVol 5.908 (3.86) 7.355 (4.01) * 6.408 (4.02)
Age 0.002 (0.00) 0.002 (0.00) 0.002 (0.00)
Dual 0.079 (0.06) 0.071 (0.06) 0.077 (0.11)
Experience -0.003 (0.01) -0.002 (0.01) -0.002 (0.01)
Fixed Effects
Adjusted R
2 0.081 0.103 0.114
Observations 11,414 11,414 11,414
The dependent variable is Revision . Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Standard 
errors are clustered by firm and year.*, **, *** Denote coefficients statistically different from zero at 
the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively (unless predicted, p-values are two-tailed). 
All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1 percent and 99 percent levels. For readability, all of the 
coefficients and standard errors are multiplied by 100. ΔExp.  is short for ΔExpectations . All variables 
are defined in the Appendix.
Table 8: Analysts' Reaction to Good News Management Forecasts
Industry/Year Industry/Year Industry/Year
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Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error
ΔExpectations 72.185 (26.29) ** 91.201 (33.83) ** 72.608 (36.13) *
Post -0.044 (0.25) 0.160 (0.27) -0.023 (0.27)
MTF 0.034 (0.88) 0.129 (1.50) -1.526 (1.31)
∆Exp. × Post -50.673 (47.01) 0.804 (53.06)
∆Exp. × MTF  41.281 (122.90) 443.590 (94.49) ***
Post × MTF -0.550 (1.28) 2.214 (1.09) *
∆Exp. × Post × MTF -647.171 (136.46) ***
Horizon 0.267 (0.11) ** 0.265 (0.12) ** 0.254 (0.13) *
Size -0.411 (0.10) *** -0.420 (0.10) *** -0.430 (0.10) ***
MTB 0.035 (0.02) 0.034 (0.02) 0.035 (0.02)
Loss -0.461 (0.61) -0.442 (0.60) -0.526 (0.59)
Cover 0.196 (0.29) 0.188 (0.31) 0.215 (0.29)
StdEarn -10.259 (12.86) -11.251 (12.42) -10.336 (11.75)
RetVol 44.135 (18.73) ** 42.682 (18.71) ** 37.244 (20.47) *
Age 0.009 (0.03) 0.008 (0.03) 0.007 (0.03)
Dual -0.067 (0.34) -0.057 (0.33) -0.062 (0.35)
Experience -0.003 (0.04) -0.002 (0.04) -0.002 (0.04)
Fixed Effects
Adjusted R
2 0.035 0.035 0.044
Observations 2,114 2,114 2,114
The dependent variable is CAR . Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Standard errors are 
clustered by firm and year. *, **, *** Denote coefficients statistically different from zero at the 10 
percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively (unless predicted, p-values are two-tailed). All 
continuous variables are winsorized at the 1 percent and 99 percent levels. For readability, all of the 
coefficients and standard errors are multiplied by 100. ΔExp.  is short for ΔExpectations . All variables 
are defined in the Appendix.
Table 9: Investor Reaction to Good News Management Forecasts
Industry/Year Industry/Year Industry/Year
